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Abstract

Recently, there has been a surge of national attention toward the U.S.-Mexican border in South
Texas, known as the Rio Grande Valley (RGV). Despite the attention and potential impact,
which the wall would directly have on the RGV community, there has been no systemic attention
paid to the opinions of the RGV residents regarding the proposed wall and other related
immigration policies. This article, therefore, aims to fill this gap by comparing immigration
policy attitudes in the borderland communities to both the national Hispanic and the general
national populations. By utilizing original data from an RGV public opinion survey we
conducted in 2018, our analysis shows that RGV residents hold more lenient immigration
attitudes than do both the national Hispanic and the general populations. We utilize logistic
regression analysis to further our understanding of the correlates of these attitudes across
different samples. Our findings provide important policy and political implications.

Keywords: U.S.-Mexico border regions, border wall, immigration, the Rio Grande Valley
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A Comparative Analysis of the Attitudes toward the U.S.-Mexico Border Policy:
Evaluating Perspectives on Border Security and Building a Wall in the Rio Grande Valley,
National Hispanic and General U.S. Populations
Recently, there has been a surge of national attention toward the U.S.-Mexican border in
South Texas, commonly known as the Rio Grande Valley (RGV). Although the southern border
areas have often been a subject of a national debate about immigration, the recent attention to the
RGV region is quite unprecedented. Since immigration resurfaced as a major national issue for
the 2016 presidential election, controversies continue today. In January 2019, President Donald
Trump declared a security and humanitarian crisis on the border in South Texas and called for
funding to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border for the sake of national security. Amid the
national turmoil around the government shutdown and privately funded border wall construction,
the “porous” border in South Texas will continue to be on the national political agenda beyond
the 2020 presidential election.
Despite the importance of the region to the national controversy, however, it is surprising
that we lack adequate and systemic attention paid to the opinion of the RGV residents regarding
the proposed wall and other related immigration policies. Only anecdotal evidence sparsely
reveals the local sentiments. In that regard, this article aims to fill this gap by providing a
systemic analysis of public opinion in the most porous region in the U.S.-Mexico border in a
comparative perspective. What attitudes do RGV residents have toward U.S.-Mexico border
security and undocumented immigrants? How is that different from the general public and
national Hispanic population? More importantly, what accounts for their attitudes toward
immigration-related issues? Are there different mechanisms at work in this region compared to
the outside of the RGV?
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Existing studies of American public opinion on immigration imply that residing in border
regions should have a distinctive influence on individuals’ immigration policy attitudes.
Residential contexts, such as growth of immigration, immigration population size, and frequency
of intergroup contact, are known to be some of the most influential factors that shape
immigration preferences (Collingwood & O’Brien Gonzalez, 2019; Enos, 2014; Hopkins, 2010;
Newman, 2013; Pearson‐Merkowitz et al., 2016; Rocha et al., 2011). In this most porous section
of U.S.-Mexico border areas, characterized by high levels of transborder mobility, large
immigrant population, and high concentration of Hispanic population, we believe residency
along the U.S.-Mexico border in South Texas should play a crucial role in forming unique
immigration policy attitudes.
Furthermore, the existing research suggests that Hispanic public opinion tends to be
divergent from that of Anglos (Greene & Kim, 2019; Huo et al., 2018; Rocha et al., 2011, 2015)
and various factors contribute to variation of immigration attitudes among Hispanic population
(Binder et al., 1997; Rocha et al., 2015; Schildkraut et al., 2019; Stringer, 2018). Based on this,
we expect that the RGV public opinion should not be only distinctive from white Caucasian
opinions, but also from the national Hispanic population. While most Hispanic opinion is
contextualized as a minority opinion at the national level, the situation is opposite in the RGV.
According to the U.S. Census estimates in 2018, the Hispanic or Latino residents account for
about 93% in the RGV areas. This study by providing an in-depth analysis of the RGV public
opinion focusing on the U.S. immigration policy and border wall sheds light on how this
majority-minority racial context affects public opinion and policy attitudes.
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In order to explore the RGV public opinion, we conducted a survey of RGV residents in
2018.1 This data set provides an exclusive opportunity to explore immigration attitudes of the
local residents and compare them to the national Hispanic population as well as the general
population. Utilizing other surveys, including the Pew Political Survey and the National Survey
of Latinos, we examine the RGV opinion in a comparative perspective and locate it in relation to
the general national population as well as the national Hispanic population. The descriptive
statistics are generally aligned with our expectation that RGV residents tend to have more lenient
immigration attitudes than the general public. It is also found that the attitudes of RGV residents
are somewhat similar to the national Hispanic population. We expand our analysis to see what
factors are associated with the leniency of RGV residents.
A logistic regression analysis of the correlates regarding the opposition to a border wall
reveals some interesting findings. First, the border issue is highly politicized, thus polarized
along both partisan and ideological cleavages. Conservatives and Republicans favor the
construction of a border wall while liberals and Democrats oppose it. This pattern is consistent
across the different samples: RGV, national Hispanic, and national non-Hispanic populations.
Second, in line with conventional wisdom, education does have a liberalizing effect on the
national non-Hispanic population. However, it does not have the same effect on the national
Hispanic population and has the opposite effect on RGV Hispanic residents. Education
significantly reduces the opposition to the construction of a border wall among RGV Hispanic

1

The opinion survey was fielded through the Center for Survey Research & Policy Analysis at
the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley. Titled the “2018 RGV Our Voice/Nuestra Voz
(OVNV) Survey,” the survey randomly selected RGV residents, aged 18 years or older residing
in Cameron, Hidalgo and Starr counties (the southernmost counties that are adjacent to the U.S.Mexico border in South Texas), and asked their views on U.S. immigration policy. The sample
of respondents totaled 660. (see, https://www.utrgv.edu/center-for-survey-research/projects/ourvoice-nuestra-voz/index.htm)
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residents. Lastly, while national Hispanics who were born in foreign countries are more likely to
oppose the border wall construction, the same status does not have any meaningful effect in the
RGV. From the analysis of the correlates, we can conclude that Democratic Party identification,
ideological liberalism, and skepticism concerning the impact of a border wall make a strong
basis for lenient attitudes towards U.S.-Mexico border policy. However, the effects of some
factors and their magnitude differ across the samples we examine.

Immigration Attitudes: Rio Grande Valley, National Hispanic and National General
Populations
There are not many studies done on public opinion in border areas. The lack of scholarly
attention becomes more pronounced if we narrow down our focus to Hispanic communities in
border areas. However, previous research suggests that it is important to study public opinion
and policy attitudes focusing on this particular racial/ethnic group in border regions. For
instance, it is known that residential contexts, such as the growth of immigration, the size of
immigrant population, or the frequency of intergroup contact, shape individuals’ immigration
attitudes (Collingwood & O'Brien Gonzelez, 2019; Enos, 2014; Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013;
Pearson‐Merkowitz, Filindra, and Dyck 2016; Rocha et al., 2011). For this reason, the focus of
our study, the RGV located in the southmost section along the U.S.-Mexico border in Texas,
provides an opportunity to examine the interaction of racial and residential contexts and how it
affects policy attitudes.
In many aspects, the RGV provides unique racial and residential contexts. First, the three
counties that are adjacent to the border have a predominantly Hispanic population. According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, the estimated percentage of the Hispanic proportion of the population
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across these counties are about 93%.2 Second, the RGV is highly mobile in terms of
immigration. While the average percentage of native-born citizens across the U.S. counties is
about 95%, the number goes down to 75% in four counties in South Texas (Cameron, Hidalgo,
Willacy, and Starr).3 Third, relatedly, the volume of the flow of people crossing the border daily
is substantial. For instance, according to the Border Crossing and Entry Data provided by the
U.S. Department of Transportation, approximately 1,163,000 persons entered the border through
Brownsville port during December, 2019.4 How would these contextual factors affect
immigration attitudes of RGV residents? Would they make RGV residents form different
attitudes from the national Hispanic population and the general population? More importantly,
would the dynamics of factors that shape immigration attitudes be different in the RGV
compared to the national Hispanic and general populations?
Existing literature suggests that border residents tend to develop liberal attitudes toward
immigration. For example, analyses about regional integration in Europe find that border
residents display more positive opinions about the European Union than the rest of the
population (Berezin & Díez-Medrano, 2008; Kuhn, 2012). Also, utilizing survey data on the

2

Across three border-adjacent counties, Hispanic or Latino population accounts for 92.4% in
Hidalgo County, 96.4% in Starr County, and 89.8% in Cameron County. (see,
https://www.census.gov/)
3
The average percentage of native-born citizens across Texas counties is about 90%.
Accordingly, the percentage of foreign-born naturalized citizens is higher in the RGV counties
(7.6 %). The national average of foreign-born naturalized citizens in countries is 1.9% while that
of Texas without the RGV counties is 2.8%. Among the foreign-born naturalized citizens in the
RGV, 92% is from Latin America while that proportion is 23% nationally. According the
Migration Policy Institute (MPI), there are approximately 142,000 unauthorized population in
both Hidalgo and Cameron counties (two of RGV counties). MPI estimated that about 90% of
them are from Mexico (It was also estimated that there are about 1.5 million unauthorized
immigrants in Texas and 11.3 million nation-wide. (see, https://www.census.gov/)
4
There were 285,701 pedestrians and 872,669 entered through personal vehicles, and 4,668
through buses. (see, https://www.bts.gov/content/border-crossingentry-data)
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Czech-German border areas, (Mirwaldt, 2010) shows that the bordering areas where people from
both countries interact to a higher degree tend to produce more favorable attitudes than
elsewhere in Germany toward the country beyond the border. The argument that the border
regions would nurture more lenient immigration attitudes is also aligned well with the existing
studies which show that Hispanic public opinion is different from that of Anglos (Greene & Kim,
2019; Huo et al., 2018; Rocha et al., 2011, 2015) and various factors contribute to variation of
immigration attitudes among Hispanic population (Binder et al., 1997; Rocha et al., 2015;
Schildkraut et al., 2019; Stringer, 2018).
Based on the previous studies, we expect the RGV public opinion in relation to
immigration to be distinctive from the rest of the country. We further believe that there might be
a difference between the RGV Hispanic population and the nationwide Hispanic population,
which has not been explored previously in the literature. Given the fact that most studies treat
Hispanic opinion as a minority opinion contextualized at the national level, we believe that even
if the national Hispanic population shares a similar stance on immigration policy with Hispanics
in the RGV, the mechanism of how these opinions are formed could be different from the RGV
regions. For this purpose, this study aims to provide a systemic comparative analysis of
immigration attitudes across not only different racial but also geographical samples by focusing
on border security and border wall construction.
In the spring of 2018, we fielded a public opinion survey of RGV residents through the
Center for Survey Research and Policy Analysis at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley.
Three questions were asked to gauge RGV residents’ opinion on immigration issues. First, we
asked what the priority for U.S. immigration policy should be. The given options were: (1)
Ensuring better border security and strengthening immigration enforcement; (2) Creating a way
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for undocumented immigrants living and working in the U.S. to obtain a legal resident status or
citizenship if they meet certain requirements; or (3) both should be given equal priority. Second,
the respondents were also asked if they are in favor of, or oppose, building a wall along the
border to Mexico. Lastly, we asked respondents how respondents evaluate the effect of the
border wall on immigration reduction. Three options were given: (1) a major reduction in
immigration, (2) a minor reduction in immigration, and (3) no reduction in immigration. These
questions follow the Pew Political Survey questions, which provide an exclusive opportunity to
explore and compare how these attitudes differ across samples.
When we compare border security attitudes across different samples, RGV, RGVHispanic, National, and National-Hispanic populations, it clearly shows that RGV residents
predominantly believe that the U.S. immigration policy should prioritize to find a way for
undocumented immigrants to become legal residents or citizens when requirements are met.
About 48% of RGV residents and 51% RGV Hispanics agreed with the statement. Only 11%
(9% for Hispanics) respondents consider better border security and immigration enforcement
should be the priority of U.S. immigration policy. According to the 2018 Pew Political Survey,5
only 31 % of the national public agree to provide a legal pathway for undocumented immigrants,
while about 21% put a more emphasis on the betterment of border security. This indicates that
the RGV residents are more empathetic toward undocumented immigrants and hesitant to the
idea of reinforcing border security than the general public. These differences are statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. However, the national Hispanic population shows a similar
sentiment to the RGV population. From the Hispanic subsample of the 2018 Pew Survey (216

5

This survey was chosen because it has the closest temporal similarity with our survey.
https://www.people-press.org/dataset/september-2018-political-survey/
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respondents), we see that about 44% agreed to provide a legal pathway for the undocumented
immigrants and its difference from the RGV residents (47% agreed) is not statistically
significant.
Figure 1 presents the attitudes toward a border wall. According to the 2017 Pew Political
Survey, approximately 63% of the general public opposes the construction of a border wall,
while 34% favors it. The highest opposition can be found among RGV Hispanic residents
(81.15%), followed by the general RGV residents (77.20%). The national Hispanic community
shares a similar sentiment with the RGV community. According to the 2018 National Survey of
Latinos, conducted by the Pew Research Institute, about 75% of the national Hispanic population
is against the wall while 22% supports it. Similar to the issue of border security versus a legal
pathway as a priority of U.S. immigration policy, the difference in the opposition to a border
wall between RGV and the general public (14.48%) is statistically significant at the 0.01 level
but not between RGV and national Hispanic samples (2.82%). However, the differences in those
who favor the wall both between RGV public and Hispanic populations (5.23%) and between
RGV Hispanic and national Hispanic population (8.14%) are statistically significant at a 0.01
level. In short, more Latinos nationwide are in favor of constructing a border wall than RGV
residents in general and more so than RGV Latinos.

[Figure 1 Here ]

In our survey, we asked a followup question to those who opposed a border wall as to
why they were against it. Among the 474 respondents who expressed their opposition, 408 of
them provided responses. About 59% of them (242 respondents) said that building a border wall
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is a waste of money because it would not work. For example, many of them stated, “waste of
money,” “it would not work,” “people will still cross,” or “it won’t make much difference.” The
second most stated response was that it would create the division of people (approximately
10%). Respondents stated, for instance, “it will separate a lot of families,” “we have families in
Mexico,” or “there shouldn’t be a division.” It reflects the fact that the volume of transborder
activities is high in the RGV through family ties, business, and other daily activities. The
remaining statements include concerns about discrimination, racism, negative image of the
country, and harmful effects on the environement and wildlife, etc.
Lastly, we gauge opinions on the effectiveness of a border wall. In line with the previous
findings, the percentage of respondents who do not believe in the effect of a border wall is high
in RGV areas. About 50% of RGV (51.7% RGV Hispanic) residents think that there would be no
effect of a border wall on reducing immigration at all, whereas only 44% of the general
population believes so. Interestingly, a slightly higher portion of the national Hispanic population
shows a pessimistic view on the effectiveness of a wall (55.17%).6 However, the difference
between the RGV and the national Hispanic samples falls short of statistical significance. On the
flip side, about 7%-8% more national Hispanic believe that a border wall will effectively reduce
immigration than do RGV general and Hispanic populations. This is statistically significant at a
0.05 level.
Through the comparative analysis among RGV, general U.S., and national Hispanic
populations, we are led to a simple conclusion. RGV residents in general hold more lenient

6

The question wording for the Pew Political Survey is slightly different from that of our survey.
However, we believe that the questions were asked in a way to make the comparison possible.
Additional information about the questions and their specific wording can be provided upon
request.
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attitudes toward immigration policy than the rest of the country, and this tendency becomes more
evident among RGV Hispanics. About half of the respondents in our RGV sample believe that
the government should find a way for undocumented immigrants to become legal residents or
citizens when requirements are met. About four of five RGV residents oppose the construction of
a border wall, and half of the respondents are skeptical about the effect of a wall in reducing
immigration. These findings conform to our expectations and the implications of prior research.
In the next section, we explore the individual-level factors that affect these attitudinal patterns
across the RGV, general U.S. and national Hispanic samples. By doing so, we aim to examine if
there are any different dynamics in the formation of immigration attitudes depending on racial
and residential contexts.

The Correlates of Border Wall Opinions
In this section, we investigate the immigration attitutudes of the RGV community more in
depth at the individual level. What accounts for the variation of opinions among RGV residents?
How are they similar to or different from the general population and the nationwide Hispanic
population? In order to address these questions, we analyze our RGV survey data as well as the
2017 Pew Political Survey7 and the 2018 National Survey of Latinos (Pew Research Center,
2018). These three data sets include the same question regarding the border wall construction,
which allows us to compare the different populations. The pattern of border wall opinion largely
conforms to that of the general immigration policy attitudes as discussed above. Thus, we plan to

7

The 2017 February Pew Political survey, conducted by the Princeton Survey Research
Associates International for the Pew Research Center, was a random-digit dialed telephone
survey with a representative sample of 1,503 adults from across the United States.
(https://www.people-press.org/dataset/february-2017-political-survey/)
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delve into the correlates of the opinion on a border wall across four different samples: RGV
residents, RGV Hispanic residents, national Hispanic, and national non-Hispanic populations.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of border wall opinion, which takes the
value of 1 when respondents oppose the construction of a border wall and 0, otherwise. As
dealing with multiple survey instruments, we need to be careful to include a standardized set of
control variables that are available in all three different survey projects. First, we include five
demographic variables: education, income, race, gender, and age. The education variable
measures the highest level of education the respondent attained. It varies from “1” Never went to
school to “7” Master’s or professional degree or higher in the RGV survey while it varies from
“1” Less than high school to “8” Postgraduate or professional degree in both the Pew Political
Survey and the National Survey of Latinos. The income variable measures each respondent’s
household income. Again, this variable is operationalized on different scales by each survey: The
RGV survey utilizes 6 categories of income, while the Pew Political Survey and the National
Survey of Latinos utilize 9 categories of income (We can provide specific coding rules for each
survey upon request.). As for race of respondents, various measures are adopted depending on
the availability and relevance of each data set. For the sample of RGV residents, we include a
dichotomous variable for those who identify themselves as having a Hispanic origin. The same
variable is not included in RGV Hispanic, national Hispanic, and national non-Hispanic models
due to its irrelevance. For the national non-Hispanic sample, we include other racial categories,
“Black” and “Other” (both dichotomous variables), leaving “non-Hispanic Whites” as a
reference category. Gender is coded as a binary variable for females across the surveys. Lastly,
age is measured as a continuous variable.
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We also include a set of political variables in our analysis: political ideology and party
identification. In both RGV and 2017 Pew surveys, respondents were asked to place themselves
on the liberal-conservative ideological scale. Thus, ideology is measured as an ordinal variable,
where higher values indicate conservatism. In the RGV sample, the variable is measured on a 1-7
scale, where “1” indicates Extremely liberal and “7” Extremely conservative. In the Pew Political
Survey, the variable is measured on a 1-5 scale, where “1” means Very liberal and “5” Very
conservative. Unfortunately, however, the 2018 National Survey of Latinos does not have a
comparable ideology variable. In order to control for ideology, we employ a proxy using the
question about religious service attendance measured on a 1-6 scale, where “1” means More than
once a week and “6” means Never. We convert the scale so that higher values indicate more
frequent attendance in religious services, suggesting conservatism. Although it is not a perfect
proxy for ideology, we find this the best measure that is available in the data set.
With this caveat, we propose expectations as follows: Conservatives are more likely to
favor the construction of a border wall than liberals. They are more likely to believe that the
reinforcement of border security should be prioritized over the provision of a legal pathway to
citizenship than their liberal counterparts. They are more likely to be optimistic about the effect
of a border wall in reducing immigration flows than liberals. Lastly, we include two dichotomous
variables for Republican and Democratic Party identifications, respectively. The reference
category is independents. We expect that being Democrats leads to more opposition to the
construction of a border wall compared to being Republicans.
Some additional control variables are also included in our analysis. First, we believe that
immigration attitudes vary depending on the immigration status of respondents. Although the
2017 Pew Political Survey does provide data about citizenship status, only 6% of the respondents
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answered the question. In both RGV and the National Survey of Latinos, respondents were asked
about their birthplace, instead of a citizenship status question. Thus, we create a dichotomous
variable, foreign-born, for those who answered that question other than the United States. Of
course, those who are born outside the U.S. could be citizens. However, following the existing
literature, we expect that there will be a significant difference between foreign-born and nativeborn Latinos in their attitudes toward immigration (Rocha et al., 2011, 2015; Rouse et al., 2010;
Sanchez, 2006; Stringer, 2016, 2018). Foreign-born Latinos are expected to have more lenient
immigration attitudes than their native-born counterparts. Second, as discussed in the previous
section, RGV residents oppose the construction of a border wall for many reasons. Among them,
a significant portion of opposition was related to the skepticism on the effectiveness of the wall
to reduce flows of immigration. Thus, we believe that controlling for its effect is important to see
the dynamics of RGV immigration attitudes.
As the dependent variable is binary, we employ a logistic regression analysis with robust
standard errors. The focus of the estimation is to compare the correlates of the opposition to the
construction of a border wall across four different samples: RGV general, RGV Hispanic,
national Hispanic, and national non-Hispanic. Although the RGV is a Hispanic dominant region,
by excluding those who identify themselves as other category and missing observations, the
percentage of Hispanic respondents in the RGV sample goes down to 78%, which gives us a
reasonable subsample size for estimating the opinion of the RGV Hispanic population. We are
interested in comparing its correlates to those of the national Hispanic community. Lastly, as we
have both RGV Hispanic and national Hispanic samples, it would be analytically more
interesting to compare these to the non-Hispanic general population. Thus, instead of the general
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population sample provided by the 2017 Pew Political Survey, we utilize non-Hispanic
population sample by excluding Hispanic respondents from it.

Analysis and Results
Table 1 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis. Some interesting patterns
emerge. First, the construction of a border wall turns out to be a highly salient and polarized
issue along the ideological and partisan cleavages. Second, following conventional wisdom,
education does have a liberalizing effect on the national non-Hispanic population. Interestingly,
however, it does not have any influence on the national Hispanic population while having a
conservatizing effect on RGV residents. Lastly, while foreign-born Hispanics in the national
sample are more likely to oppose the border wall construction, the same status does not have any
meaningful effect in the RGV. From the analysis of the correlates, we can conclude that both
Democratic Party identification and widespread disbelief in the impact of a border wall make a
strong basis for the opposition towards the proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall. We discuss each
point in depth in the remainder of this section.

[Table 1 Here]

It is not surprising to note that a border wall was a highly salient and polarized issue
around 2018. Our comparative analysis of multiple data sets provide solid evidence for this
point. As Table 1 shows, both conservatives and Republicans favor the border wall construction
while liberals and Democrats are against it. This pattern is found consistently across all four
samples. The regression coefficients of both ideology and Republicans are negative and
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statistically significant at a 0.01 level while the variable, Democrats, is positive and statistically
significant except for the RGV Hispanics.
In Table 2, we calculate the marginal effects of party identification variables. While
holding other variables at their mean values, Republicans are about 18-31 percentage points
more likely to approve the construction of a border wall than independents across samples. The
differences in predicted probabilities for Republicans are smallest in the general RGV sample
(18%), followed by RGV Hispanic Republicans (24%). We find the biggest marginal effect
among national Hispanic Republicans (31%), followed by national non-Hispanic Republicans
(30%). Thus, at the national level, Republicans with a Hispanic origin are about 31 percent more
likely to approve a border wall than their independent counterparts, all else equal.

[Table 2 Here]

Democratic Party ID has an opposite effect on the opinion of a border wall. Democrats
are more likely to oppose the wall regardless of locality. In the RGV, Democrats are about 11%
more likely to oppose the construction of a border wall than independents. Among Hispanic and
non-Hispanic populations in the nation, Democrats are about 16% and 20% more likely to
oppose the wall than independents, respectively. There is one exception to this pattern.
Interestingly, among RGV Hispanics, Democratic Party ID does not have any discernible
difference from independents on the opposition of a border wall. As the RGV being a Hispanic
dominant region, this suggests that the partisan cleavage on the border wall issue is driven by
Republicans in the RGV.
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A similar pattern is found with ideology. Table 1 shows that the ideology variable has a
negative and statistically significant coefficient across all four samples. Given that we use a
proxy variable, the frequency of religious service attendance, for the National Survey of Latinos
and that it is difficult to pinpoint a reference category for getting marginal effects, we calculate
predicted probabilities instead for each value of the ideology variable for respective surveys.
Table 3 presents the results. Across the samples, it is found that ideology has statistically
significant effects on the opposition of a border wall by moving one standard deviation below
and above the mean. For example, in the RGV sample, those who identify themselves as
“Liberal” are about 19.4% more likely to oppose the wall than those who identify themselves as
“Conservative”; the percentage difference slightly drops to 12% for RGV Hispanics. Although
we should be cautious to make an inference from the proxy measure of ideology adopted for the
national Hispanic population, we find a similar pattern. The more secular (liberal), the more
against a border wall. The ideological cleavage around a border wall seems enormously profound
among the national non-Hispanic population. Liberals are about 58% more likely to oppose the
idea of border wall construction than conservatives in the national non-Hispanic population.
These suggest that a border wall falls along the left-right ideological cleavage and the ideological
schasm is deeper among non-Hispanic populations outside of the RGV.
[Table 3 Here]

Other demographic variables also provide some interesting insights. The effect of
education in the RGV stands out. In the literature of American public opinion, the general
consensus is that education pushes one toward the liberal side of the ideological continuum.
Model 4 in Table 1 confirms the conventional wisdom; education leads to the opposition to a
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border wall among the national non-Hispanic population. However, Model 3 in Table 1 suggests
that education does not have any influence among the national Hispanic community. More
interestingly, as suggested by Model 1 and Model 2, education turns out to have a conservative
effect among RGV residents. Residents with higher levels of education are more supportive of a
border wall in the RGV. In order to explore the dynamics, we calculate predicted probabilities
across the different values of the education variable for both RGV Hispanic and national
Hispanic samples.

[Figure 2 Here]

Figure 2 displays the results. The negative trend on the probability of opposing the wall is
apparent as the level of education progresses in the RGV Hispanic sample. The probability of
opposing a border wall is above 90% among RGV Hispanics with no education at all and less
than 9th grade education (lowest two categories of education). As the years of education increase,
the predictied probability of opposing a wall decreases and becomes statistically at a 0.10 level at
the education value of 5 (“some college”). Our findings complement those found by Binder, et al
(1997) and Miller, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1984). On the other hand, we do not find a similar
pattern among the national Hispanic population (see Appendix Figure A.1). Regardless of the
levels of education, the predicted probability of opposing a border wall stays constant around
77%. For the national non-Hispanic sample, the predicted probability for the lowest education
category, “Less than high school,” is about 52%. As education increases, the probability of
opposition continues to rise, and the marginal effect becomes statistically significant at a 0.01
level when education reaches the level of 5 “Two years of an associate degree from a college”..

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

21

Both gender and age have some interesting results. First, the female variable has a
positive influence on the opposition to a border wall only for the national Hispanic population
while it does not have any statistically significant effects in other samples. Our calculation of
predicted probabilities suggests that nationwide, Latinas are about 8% more likely to oppose a
border wall than Latino males, all else equal. The age variable yields the opposite pattern. Age
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in both national samples. As age increases,
individuals tend to be more supportive of a border wall nationwide. However, age turns out to
have no significant effect in the RGV samples.
We also include place of birth, coded as “Foreign Born.” In line with previous studies,
Model 3 shows that foreign-born individuals tend to oppose the construction of a border wall
more than those who were born in the U.S. It confirms that those who have immigration
backgrounds are likely to be empathetic regarding immigration policy. Its coefficients in Models
1 and 2 do not reach a statistical significance but still their signs are positive. Relatedly, being
Hispanic in the RGV sample seems to define individuals’ opinion on a border wall strongly as
suggested by Model 1 of Table 1. Lastly, not surprisingly, skepticism on the effect of the border
wall has a positive influence on the opposition to its construction. As discussed above, it is
straightforward to expect that those who believe building a wall is a waste of money or it divides
family ties would object the border wall construction.

Discussion
Since 2016, border security has emerged as one of the most hotly debated issues in
American politics as President Trump focuses policy effort and resources on building a border
wall. In the midst of the ongoing debate, however, public opinion in the U.S.-Mexico border
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regions is largely missing, although the proposed wall would impact these communities directly.
In this regard, this article provides a missing piece to the current debate. Through the exploration
of the 2018 RGV survey in comparison to the 2018 National Survey of Latinos and the 2017
Pew Political Survey, we systematically analyze immigration attitudes of the residents of the Rio
Grande Valley. Largely in line with the previous research on borderlands, RGV residents hold a
more lenient stance on immigration than those residing in the rest of the nation. The vast
majority of the RGV residents display considerable opposition to the construction of a border
wall, but a high level of support for the idea that grants a legal pathway for undocumented
immigrants to become residents or citizens.
However, RGV opinions are hardly liberal monolithic, but some interesting variations are
found in comparison to the national Hispanic and national non-Hispanic populations. First,
unlike other areas of the country where education is associated with more liberal and empathetic
immigration attitudes, education tends to foster conservative attitudes in the southmost
borderlands of Texas. Given that the RGV is one of the most economically disadvantaged
regions of the nation, some might argue that education works as a proxy measure of
socioeconomic status, which in turn correlates with conservative immigration attitudes in the
region. However, in our models, household income does not have a statistically significant
effect. Although the correlation between education and household income is quite high (r = .52),
excluding education from the regression analysis does not make the income variable statistically
significant.
Instead of socioeconomic status, we suggest education may capture an acculturation
effect in the RGV. As discussed above, the RGV is one of the regions with the highest volume of
transborder mobility in the nation. For this reason, significant portion of the population in the
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RGV has immigration backgrounds to various degrees and the level of exposure to immigrants or
foreign nationals is considerably high. In this context, the level of educational attainment may
capture the time individuals spent in the U.S. and the degree of assimilation or embeddedness
into the American society. If this is the case, we can assume that the more educated individuals
become, the less sympathetic they become toward new comers and are more willing to
differentiate themselves from new comers. This requires a further analysis.
Second, another interesting finding is that the role of ideology in forming immigration
attitudes in both RGV and national Hispanic populations is less significant than in the national
non-Hispanic population. As is shown in Table 3, in the non-Hispanic national sample, the
percentage difference in the predicted probability of opposing a border wall is approximately
76% between “Very liberal” and “Very conservative.” The gap shrinks dramatically to 12.6% in
the overall RGV sample and to 19.5% in the RGV Hispanic sample. A similar pattern is also
found in the national Hispanic sample; there is only 11% difference in the predicted probability
of opposing a border wall between those who “Never” attend religious services and those who
attend “More than once a week.” Why is the impact of ideology on the opposition to a border
wall considerably weaker in the RGV and among national Hispanic population than the national
non-Hispanic population? Does it suggest that the national debates over a border wall and other
controvertial immigration policies have been driven by the ideological cleavage that exists in the
non-Hispanic populations? Or conversely, does immigration policy deepen the existing
ideological cleavage in the non-Hispanic populations at the national level? Or, does this simply
mean that the conservatives in the RGV and the nationwide Hispanic population are not
conservative enough? It will be interesting to investigate RGV conservatives and conservative
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Hispanics at both RGV and national levels further, and figure out the factors that make these
particular populations different from the rest of the nation.
Lastly, we also find that the differing effects of gender across the samples need further
explanations. Why does being female lead to more opposition to a border wall among the
national Hispanic population only whereas it has no effect on other samples? We leave all these
unanswered questions for our future research projects.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

25
Figures and Tables

Figure 1
The U.S.-Mexico Border Wall
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Table 1
The Border Wall Opposition across Different Samples
RGV
RGV
Hispanic
Model 1
Model 2
Education
Household income
Ideology (conservative) 1
Democrats
Republicans
Female
Age
Foreign born
Ineffectiveness of Wall
Hispanic origin

-0.204*
(0.116)
0.035
(0.085)
-0.259***
(0.100)
0.829**
(0.327)
-0.846**
(0.379)
0.009
(0.269)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.356
(0.339)
1.245***
(0.288)
1.156***
(0.440)

-0.265**
(0.129)
0.044
(0.090)
-0.269**
(0.108)
0.577
(0.352)
-1.278***
(0.398)
0.004
(0.295)
-0.004
(0.009)
0.228
(0.362)
1.247***
(0.311)

National
Hispanic
Model 3

Pew National
Non-Hispanic
Model 4

0.047
(0.043)
-0.055
(0.036)
-0.151***
(0.050)
1.103***
(0.185)
-1.315***
(0.203)
0.575***
(0.158)
-0.022***
(0.005)
0.949***
(0.178)

0.154***
(0.048)
0.034
(0.040)
-0.983***
(0.100)
1.123***
(0.218)
-1.217***
(0.203)
0.204
(0.165)
-0.014***
(0.005)

Black

1.119***
(0.370)
-0.312
(0.259)

Other

Constant

Observations

1.747*
(0.998)

3.263***
(0.939)

1.977***
(0.343)

3.135***
(0.494)

438

394

1,210

1,147

Note. 1 For National Hispanic Population, ideology was replaced by religious service attendance.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2
The Marginal Effect of Party Identification on Wall Opposition
RGV
RGV Hispanic
National Hispanic
Non-Hispanic Public

Variables
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats

Dydx(Wall opposition)
-.176
.109
-.244
.062
-.307
.155
-.295
.195

Lower
-.356
.024
-.424
-.014
-.400
.107
-.386
.127

Upper
-.011
.189
-.078
.138
-.214
.203
-.203
.264

Table 3
The Predicted Probability of Ideology on Wall Opposition
RGV
1: Extremely liberal
2: Liberal
3: Slightly liberal
4: Moderate
5: Slightly conservative
6: Conservative
7: Extremely conservative
RGV Hispanic
1: Extremely liberal
2: Liberal
3: Slightly liberal
4: Moderate
5: Slightly conservative
6: Conservative
7: Extremely conservative
National Latino
1: Never
2: Seldom
3: A few times a year
4: Once or twice a month
5: Once a week
6: More than once a week
National non-Hispanic
1: Very liberal
2: Liberal
3: Moderate

Pr(Opposition)
0.797
0.926
0.91
0.833
0.861
0.732
0.671
Pr(Opposition)
0.86
0.927
0.916
0.871
0.876
0.809
0.665
Pr(Opposition)
0.800
0.836
0.795
0.765
0.726
0.689
Pr(Opposition)
0.928
0.921
0.699

SE
0.096
0.042
0.052
0.033
0.054
0.051
0.082
SE
0.085
0.043
0.048
0.03
0.052
0.047
0.079
SE
0.033
0.025
0.025
0.033
0.026
0.043
SE
0.024
0.018
0.027

Lower
0.609
0.843
0.809
0.768
0.755
0.632
0.51
Lower
0.693
0.843
0.821
0.812
0.774
0.716
0.511
Lower
0.736
0.788
0.746
0.701
0.675
0.604
Lower
0.880
0.885
0.646

Upper
0.985
1.01
1.012
0.898
0.966
0.832
0.833
Upper
1.027
1.011
1.011
0.929
0.977
0.901
0.82
Upper
0.865
0.884
0.844
0.829
0.777
0.774
Upper
0.976
0.956
0.751
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4: Conservative
5: Very conservative
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0.340
0.167

0.029
0.038

0.284
0.094

0.396
0.241
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Figure 2
The Predicted Probabilities across Education: RGV Hispanic vs. National Non-Hispanic

Note. The upper and lower values indicate 90% confidence intervals

30

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

31

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

32
References

Berezin, M., & Díez-Medrano, J. (2008). Distance Matters: Place, Political Legitimacy and
Popular Support for European Integration. Comparative European Politics, 6(1), 1–32.
DOI:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110119
Binder, N., Polinard, J., & Wrinkle, R. (1997). Mexican American and Anglo attitudes toward
immigration reform: A view from the border. Social Science Quarterly, 78, 324–337.
http://www.jstor.com/stable/42864340
Collingwood, L., & O’Brien Gonzalez, B. (2019). Public Opposition to Sanctuary Cities in
Texas: Criminal Threat or Immigration Threat? Social Science Quarterly, 100(4), 1182–
1196. DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12632
Enos, R. (2014). Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 111(10), 3699–3704.
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/111/10/3699.full.pdf%20
Greene, W., & Kim, M. (2019). Hispanic Millennial Ideology: Surprisingly, No Liberal
“Monolith” Among College Students. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 41(3),
287–311. DOI: 10.1177/0739986319862829
Hopkins, D. (2010). Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local
opposition. American Political Science Review, 104(1), 40–60.
http://www.jstor.com/stable/27798539
Huo, Y., Dovidio, J., Jiménez, T., & Schildkraut, D. (2018). Not just a national issue: Effect of
state‐level reception of immigrants and population changes on intergroup attitudes of
Whites, Latinos, and Asians in the United States. Journal of Social Issues, 74(4), 716–
736. DOI: 10.1111/josi.12295

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

33

Kuhn, T. (2012). Europa Ante Portas: Border Residence, Transnational Interaction and
Euroscepticism in Germany and France. European Union Politics, 13(1), 94–117. DOI:
10.1177/1465116511418016
Mirwaldt, K. (2010). Contact, Conflict and Geography: What Factors Shape Cross-Border
Citizen Relations? Political Geography, 29(8), 434–443.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.10.004

Newman, B. (2013). Acculturating contexts and Anglo opposition to immigration in the United
States. American Journal of Political Science, 57(2), 374–390. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540
5907.2012.00632.x
Pearson‐Merkowitz, S., Filindra, A., & Dyck, J. (2016). When partisans and minorities interact:
Interpersonal contact, partisanship, and public opinion preferences on immigration
policy. Social Science Quarterly, 97(2), 311–324. DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12175
Pew Research Center. (2018, October 25). More Latinos Have Serious Concerns About Their
Place in America Under Trump.
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/dataset/2018-national-survey-of-latinos/
Rocha, R., Knoll, B., & Wrinkle, R. (2015). Immigration enforcement and the redistribution of
political trust. The Journal of Politics, 77(4), 901–913. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/681810
Rocha, R., Longoria, T., Wrinkle, R., Knoll, B., Polinard, J., & Wenzel, J. (2011). Ethnic context
and immigration policy preferences among Latinos and Anglos. Social Science
Quarterly, 92(1), 1–19.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.15406237.2011.00754.x?casa_token=v
z-fyKt1duIAAAAA:VkMlfTPLm-ZhqPKMv4JNZ7li9zax_LfHMyH4uIKrAE_R55TXzj2QRUlim4jJBqV8a0lP_Jq2A92jhz9

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

34

Rouse, S., Wilkinson, B. C., & Garand, J. (2010). Divided Loyalties? Understanding Variation in
Latino Attitudes Toward Immigration. Social Science Quarterly, 91(3), 856–882.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.15406237.2010.00723.x?casa_token=n_TjdlOqeasAAAAA:s-PGwYbor3EWp-eHYRQ9EJ6YxeWhaGIZ3Hx7rx11Yx0mY3J04ZmnepKY4RR-ZfvhChkcLbire4YjwTX

Sanchez, G. (2006). The role of group consciousness in Latino public opinion. Political
Research Quarterly, 59(3), 435–446.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/106591290605900311?casa_token=x4D_kj
aCUjMAAAAA:SP_l1D2CpkGGnjf3kdYhX2OZly1aJYOqti4fVeDAsvcOrmRre3o8wT_
FZ8iZF8TsX4aToIWm0-PNIA
Schildkraut, D., Jiménez, T., Dovidio, J., & Huo, Y. (2019). A tale of two states: How state
immigration climate affects belonging to state and country among Latinos. Social
Problems, 66, 332–355. https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spy008
Stringer, A. (2016). Latino Attitudes toward Ballot Propositions that Target Immigrants.
Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 38(4), 467–481. DOI:
10.1177/0739986316664156
Stringer, A. (2018). Crossing the Border: Latino Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy. Journal
of International Migration and Integration, 19(3), 701–715.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0543-7

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

35

Author Biographies
Dongkyu Kim, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Texas
Rio Grande Valley. His research focuses on topics of international/comparative political
economy, including international fishery governance, racial diversity, income inequality, social
protest, social capital, and foreign direct investment.

Mi-son Kim, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley. Her research focuses on political party & electoral systems, campaigns &
elections, and public opinion with a regional focus on East Asian politics and U.S. politics.

Natasha Altema McNeely, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in Political Science at the
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley. Her research focuses on race and ethnicity and gender
in the context of political Institutions, political behavior, voting, campaigns & elections.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

36
Appendix A

Table A.1
A Legal Pathway for Undocumented Immigrants: RGV & RGV Hispanic
RGV
RGV Hispanic
Model 1
Model 2
Education
Household income
Ideology (conservative)
Democrats
Republicans
Female
Age
Foreign born
Border Has No effect
Hispanic origin
Constant cut1
Constant cut2
Observations
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.094
(0.087)
-0.059
(0.066)
-0.191***
(0.065)
0.184
(0.210)
-0.925***
(0.358)
0.230
(0.200)
-0.012*
(0.007)
0.685***
(0.243)
0.349*
(0.202)
0.230
(0.419)

0.123
(0.091)
-0.063
(0.069)
-0.122*
(0.067)
0.125
(0.220)
-1.014**
(0.411)
0.199
(0.212)
-0.009
(0.007)
0.620**
(0.252)
0.382*
(0.209)

-2.757***
(0.744)
-0.479
(0.739)

-2.662***
(0.612)
-0.232
(0.608)

431

389
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Figure A.1.
Predicted Probability of Border Wall Opposition among national Hispanics

Note. The upper and lower values indicate 90% confidence intervals
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